Comments on: Verifiable Electronic Voting

By: David Bismark

David Bismark — Fri, 24 Feb 2012 13:02:17 +0000

There are many versions of Prêt à Voter now, with voters writing real numbers instead of the seven-segment thing and so forth. The scanner does check that it is a valid vote that it recognizes and if not, then you are allowed to exchange it for a new ballot form (if you spoilt your vote by over or under voting for example) and try again.

By: David Bismark

David Bismark — Fri, 24 Feb 2012 12:25:46 +0000

This is called “ballot box stuffing” and is a serious problem all around the world already. In fact, it is not specifically part of the work we have done so far. There are different ways of getting to grips with this problem and many countries around the world publish lists of all the eligible voters and all the voters who cast a vote in the past election so that people can scrutinise these.

By: David Bismark

David Bismark — Fri, 24 Feb 2012 12:21:03 +0000

This is called “chain voting” and it is a very serious attack in any place where the ballot form is a restricted resource. And you are quite right that chain voting in this setting, where the coercer can check after the close of the election that the correct vote has been submitted, is a serious problem – but there are solutions proposed in the research community over the past few years.

By: David Bismark

David Bismark — Fri, 24 Feb 2012 12:16:56 +0000

There is no license that you need to get to use the system as it has been published in scientific journals and papers. But you would then have to make an implementation of the verifiable voting system by yourself – please do get in touch if you want to discuss that further.

By: David Bismark

David Bismark — Fri, 24 Feb 2012 12:15:42 +0000

It’s great to be in contact with you now Danny. For anyone else who feel they might be able to use this kind of technology I can only say: get in touch! We are coming from the academic world so we are all about sharing the great ideas.

By: David Bismark

David Bismark — Fri, 24 Feb 2012 12:12:21 +0000

The ballot form has to become void when it is audited because it reveals secret information that can be used to prove what the vote is, if it is also used to cast a vote.

Thanks for your suggestions!

By: David Bismark

David Bismark — Fri, 24 Feb 2012 12:11:08 +0000

That’s right, you can only either audit a ballot form or use it to cast the vote. The audit reveals information that you otherwise could use to prove to an attacker how you voted.

By: Anonymous

Anonymous — Sat, 07 Jan 2012 08:18:14 +0000

Is a ballot void if it’s audited?

By: Anonymous

Anonymous — Sat, 17 Dec 2011 02:10:15 +0000

Good TED talk, David! I like this idea so much! And I really appreciate how meticulously you address all questitons here.

After the voter audits a ballot form he obtains a fresh ballot. Is this because the ballot he audited becomes void?

May I suggest you update the article text above and incorporate your answers to some of the issues raised by all the comments here? Working through all the comments to find answers is a bit of a hassle

By: Danny

Danny — Tue, 08 Nov 2011 14:47:30 +0000

I have a question–I am a student helping a team that will be designing South Sudan’s future electoral system and I am very interested in your voting system. However, for cost purposes, I would need to tweak it a bit. How do I get in contact to discuss this further?